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CHANGING PEOPLE'S PREFERENCES BY THE
STATE AND THE LAW

Ariel Porat*

In standard economic models, two basic assumptions are made: the
first, that actors are rational and, the second, that actors'
preferences are a given and exogenously determined. Behavioral
economics—followed by behavioral law and economics—has
questioned the first assumption. This article challenges the second
one, arguing that in many instances, social welfare should be
enhanced not by maximizing satisfaction of existing preferences but
by changing the preferences themselves. The article identifies seven
categories of cases where the traditional objections to intentional
preferences change by the state and the law lose force and argues
that in these cases, such a change warrants serious consideration.
The article then proposes four different modes of intervention in
people's preferences, varying in intensity, on the one hand, and the
identity of their addressees, on the other, and explains the relative
advantages and disadvantages of each form of intervention.
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INTRODUCTION
Standard economic models make two basic assumptions: the
first, that actors are rational and, the second, that actors' preferences
are a given and exogenously determined.1 Behavioral economics—
followed by behavioral law and economics—questioned the
rationality assumption, with scholars in the field showing time and
again that actors are often irrational in predictable ways. 2 Today,

1

See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 5 (1976)
(presenting the fundamental economic assumption of stable preferences); George J.
Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM. ECON. REV.
76, 76 (1977) (“Tastes are the unchallengeable axioms of a man's behavior: he may
properly (usefully) be criticized for inefficiency in satisfying his desires, but the
desires themselves are data. Deplorable tastes-say, for arson-may be countered by
coercive and punitive action, but these deplorable tastes, at least when held by an
adult, are not capable of being changed by persuasion.”); Matthew Rabin,
Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 11, 11 (1998) ("Economics
has conventionally assumed that each individual has stable and coherent
preferences, and that she rationally maximizes those preferences.").
2
See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach
to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998) (presenting behavioral
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behavioral economics is justifiably considered an important subfield
of economics.
This article challenges the second assumption of the economic
(and law and economics) models. It argues that in many instances,
social welfare should be enhanced not by maximizing the satisfaction
of existing preferences but by changing the preferences themselves.
To illustrate, imagine that in State X, people have strong
preferences for sweet (and, let’s assume, unhealthy) food.3 If
preferences are taken as a given, the state should aim to maximize
the satisfaction of the sum of all of its constituents’ preferences,
including for sweet food. Alternatively, the state could aim to change
people's preferences for sweet food and, once that has been
accomplished, maximize the satisfaction of all existing preferences,
including the newly acquired ones. It is possible that most or even all
individuals would thus be better off in terms of satisfying their
preferences. First, those people with a preference for sweet food
would now be healthier and happier than they were before the
change to their preferences. Second, perhaps some social resources
(such as the costs of manufacturing sweet food products) would be
saved and directed instead to satisfying other preferences of the
former sweet-food lovers or the preferences of other people.
So should the state consider changing its constituents’
preferences as a social-welfare enhancing measure? Is it even
appropriate for the state and the law to intervene in peoples'
preferences to try to change them? Many preferences—such as those
relating to sexual orientation—are rightly considered by many to be
either unchangeable or such that the state should not intervene in.
Other preferences are considered to merit being changed by the state
or by others. For example, parents often try to change their children's

economics studies that challenge the rational actor assumption and discussing their
implications for the economic analysis of law). For examples of notable
contributions in the field of behavioral economics that have called into question the
rationality assumption, see Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory:
An Analysis of Decision under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979) (explaining
how economic decision-making under uncertainty diverges from neo-classical
theory, which is predicated on the notion of rational choice); Amos Tversky &
Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211
SCIENCE 453 (1981) (showing that preferences shift in predictable ways when the
same problem is framed in different ways); Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetch &
Richard Thaler, Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion and Status Quo
Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 193 (1991) (showing that people often demand
more to give up an object than they would be willing to pay to acquire it).
3
RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 1-2 (2009) (showing that
small changes in the food setting in school cafeterias can increase the consumption
of healthy food).
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preferences, as teachers try to shape their pupils’ preferences. The
state attempts to change value preferences by, for example, educating
its citizens to be loyal to the state or to preserve the environment.
Market forces transform people's preferences on a daily basis;
Facebook, smartphones, and personal computers are just a few of the
abundant examples of how the market can radically change people’s
preferences.4
While the market, the state and sometimes the law commonly
shape people's preferences, intentional and, in particular, coercive
intervention in those preferences by the state and the law is generally
considered to be illegitimate and even dangerous (with a few
exceptions, such as soft education for commonly accepted values).
Why is this so? Suppose that the state's goal is to change people's
preferences in order to maximize social welfare, thereby making
every individual better off. Would such a goal be objectionable?5
Would changing people's preferences for unhealthy food be a
legitimate goal for the state to pursue if we assume that all
consumers will be better off once the change takes place?
Alternatively, suppose (even though there is no good reason to
assume this) that social welfare would be enhanced were all people
to have heterosexual preferences. Very few would argue that the
state should intervene to change people's sexual orientation even if
no individual would be worse off. The question that arises, then, is
what underlies the opposition to the state’s changing people’s
preferences?
A number of objections can be raised against intentional state
intervention in people's preferences. First, allowing the state to
change preferences could infringe on individual freedom: instead of
letting individuals shape their preferences by themselves, the state
would be doing this for them.6 Second, the state might abuse its
power and change people's preferences not to promote their own
welfare but to promote the rulers' interests.7 Third, allowing the state
to change people's preferences would entail that it take a stand on
4

The widespread use of smartphones, for example, could be explained by the
network effect: the more people who have smartphones, the more beneficial it is to
use them. Yet clearly, there is more to the choice of many to own a smartphone; it
derives also from their (relatively new) preference to be in constant contact with
others.
5
It would then be a Pareto, rather than Kaldor-Hicks, improvement. Cf. Robert
Cooter, Models of Morality in Law and Economics: Self-Control and SelfImprovement for the "Bad Man" of Holmes, 78 B.U. L. REV. 903, 922-25 (1998)
(explaining that Pareto self-improvement refers to a change in preferences that
would be preferred by both the actor's original and final (after-change) self).
6
Infra Section I.B.
7
Infra Section I.B.
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which preferences are the "good” ones deserving of promotion and
which are the "bad" ones that should be repressed. Allowing the state
such a role would conflict with liberal political theory, which calls
for a neutral role for the state in promoting the social good.8 Fourth
and lastly, any effort to change people's preferences would
necessarily entail uncertainty: it is typically unclear as to whether
any given change would increase or decrease social welfare.9
Insofar as they are intended to be general and broad in scope,
these four objections to state intervention in preferences lose force
once we acknowledge that in actuality, the state and the law
influence our preferences in most aspects of our lives and, more
importantly, that this is entirely unavoidable. Rights and duties, the
allocation of private and public resources, and the social structure in
which we live shape our preferences from the moment we are born.
This seems to occur unintentionally, implicitly, and coincidentally,
but it nevertheless occurs universally. So if this is the case, why
should the intervention not be purposive, explicit, and with
appropriate awareness, thereby making transparent a process that is
currently obfuscated and surreptitious?10 Transparency would make
the process of preferences change by the state subject to public (as
well as judicial) scrutiny and consistent with the basic tenets of
liberal democracy.11
I begin in Part I by laying out what “preferences” will refer to in
this article. I distinguish between internal and external preferences
and among preferences that are tastes, preferences tied to personal
characteristics or tendencies, preferences relating to other people,
preferences relating to ways of life, and preferences motivated by

8

Infra Section I.B.
Infra Section I.B.
10 At the same time, it could be argued that coincidental changes of preferences by
the state are inevitable and their presence does not justify intentional changes. See
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 66-71 (1993) (arguing that publicity is an
aspect of fairness); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences,
53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1154 (1986) (arguing that some preferences are the
product of past power relations and therefore a transparent preferences change
policy can shape these distorted preferences in accordance with liberal principles).
11
Cass Sunstein asserted, in an article he published in 1986, that existing
objections to changing private preferences through the law notwithstanding, this
should be done, for the most part, in cases where some type of collective action
problem is preventing a desirable change. Sunstein, supra note 11. Here, I add
several categories of cases to those Sunstein discussed, as well as offering more
general guidelines for state intervention. In particular, I suggest various ways of
changing people's preferences, including "nudging," a technique proposed by
Thaler & Sunstein for changing people's behavior but not preferences, THALER &
SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, and show how they can be applied in different contexts.
9
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personal values. The discussion then elaborates on possible
objections to the state’s changing preferences. This sets the stage for
the article's main claim, put forth in Part II, namely, that at least in
some circumstances, these objections lose their force. Part III
proposes four possible ways the state can intervene in preferences
and the Conclusion summarizes the arguments made in the article.12
I. PREFERENCES AND OBJECTIONS TO INTENTIONAL STATE AND LAW
INTERVENTION
This part of the article lays the groundwork for identifying cases
in which at least certain modes of intentional state and law
intervention in people's preferences can be expected to trigger fewer
objections than in other cases. Section A defines "preferences" for
the purposes of this article, explaining that the term is used in a far
broader sense here than how it is generally used by economists.
Section B then elaborates on the central possible grounds for
objecting to the state changing preferences.
A. Defining Preferences
To define preferences, I will first exclude what can be termed
external, as opposed to internal, preferences. External preferences
refer to people’s desires to give precedence to one act or state of the
world over another act or state of the world when this is motivated
by either threat of sanction or promise of benefit from others. A
person who likes smoking might have an external preference not to
smoke because he fears legal sanctions or expects condemnation
from his friends and family. A person might have an external
preference not to smoke also because the price of cigarettes has gone
up or he’s been offered a monetary reward if he stops smoking. Such
preferences are beyond the scope of this article, which focuses on
internal preferences, namely, those preferences that are generated by
internal, rather than external, forces.13 For example, the person who
12

A full-fledged theory of justified preferences change by the state should take into
account also the psychological and physiological processes of such a change and
not only the normative impediments. See Amir N. Licht, Law for the Common
Man: An Individual-Level Theory of Values, Expanded Rationality, and the Law,
74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 175, 188 (2011) (presenting the psychological
aspects of preferences change).
13
Some take "preferences" to refer only to internal preferences, while others see it
as encompassing both internal and external preferences. Daphna LewinsohnZamir, The Importance of Being Earnest: Two Notions of Internalization, 65 U.
TORONTO L.J. 37, 49-51 (2005) (explaining that whereas internal preferences are
attributed to intrinsic motivations, external preferences are attributed to external
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likes smoking has an internal preference to do so even though his
external preference is to stop smoking.
Internal preferences (which I’ll hereinafter refer to simply as
"preferences") can be both strictly and broadly defined. Strictly
defined, they are the desires people have, when motivated by internal
forces, to favor one act or state of the world over another. Broadly
defined, preferences include also the values and tastes people have
that affect and shape their strictly defined preferences. In this article,
preferences will be broadly, rather than strictly, construed.
What preferences do people have? One type of preferences is
tastes, for example, a preference for sweet food. Someone with a
taste for sweet food will be driven to prefer (strictly speaking) one
type of food (sweet) over another type (non-sweet).
A second type of preferences relates to personal characteristics
or tendencies, like sexual preferences, for example. A man’s
homosexual tendencies result in his preference (strictly speaking) of
intimate relations with a man rather than with a woman.
A third type of preferences relates to attitudes towards other
people, such as racist preferences. A person with racist preferences
prefers (strictly speaking) the company of people from one or more
races to the company of people from another race or other races.
A fourth type of preferences is connected to ways of life, for
example, the preference to live as part of a family unit or to be
connected to many (or few) people. A person with a preference to
live as part of a family unit prefers (strictly speaking) getting married
(or living with a common-law partner) to remaining single.
Fifth and lastly, there are preferences that are tied to values that
people hold, such as solidarity, individualism, or materialism.14 A
person with a preference for solidarity, for example, might prefer
(strictly speaking) to support (morally or materially) certain groups
or communities with whom she identifies over not supporting those
groups or communities.
It becomes clear, then, that preferences often involve views and
incentives).
14
The term "preference" could relate to almost everything, including matters that
are in no way connected to the well-being of the preference holder (say, an
American citizen with a preference that the Israeli prime minister be goodlooking). Therefore, some argue, the only preferences that should count are those
that relate to the preference holder's life or well-being. See, e.g., DEREK PARFIT,
REASONS AND PERSONS 484 (1987). But see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 275-76 (1980). Dworkin distinguishes between external preferences,
which relate to other people, and internal preferences, which relate to the
preference holder. According to Dworkin, only the latter should count. See also
AMARTYA SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES 14-15 (1999), who maintains
that a person's private preferences derive from his conception of what he can attain.
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moral stances that might be based on accurate or false evidence or
beliefs. Thus, a person might prefer sweet to non-sweet food based
on the mistaken perception that the former is healthier than the latter;
he might prefer to avoid social interaction with gay people, believing
homosexuality to be immoral; he might have racist preferences
regarding ethnic minorities, holding them to be inferior; or he might
prefer not to smoke or to eat excessively even though he enjoys both,
simply because he believes smoking and overeating to be unhealthy.
Even addictions are preferences under this article's terminology,
regardless of whether the addict prefers, in a deep sense, not to be
addicted.15
Certain distinctions emerge amongst the examples presented
thus far: between authentic and acquired preferences; between
preferences that are central to an individual's personality and
preferences that are peripheral to personality; and between
preferences with a moral or value dimension and preferences that
lack such a dimension. While these distinctions are important in any
discussion of preferences and the various options for changing them,
all of these preferences are related to as simply "preferences" in the
discussion in this article.
B. Against Intentional State Intervention
Why should intentional state and law intervention in people's
preferences not be allowed as an intermediate measure towards
maximizing social welfare? On what grounds could this be opposed?
One argument against such intervention in preferences concerns
personal freedom: regardless of whether changing a person’s
preferences enhances her welfare, her freedom would be infringed
on. Per this argument, freedom precedes welfare, at least insofar as
the basic freedom to shape one's preferences is concerned.
Interfering with this freedom, the argument goes, is analogous to
cloning human beings as it alters their self and identity.
This argument rests on the premise that a person should have the
freedom to choose her preferences just as she has the freedom to
15

There are philosophers who would consider only rational preferences based on a
deliberative process in which a person chooses her own rational ends to be internal
preferences. This is a Kantian conception, under which only rational behavior,
which is directed at choosing the right end, is authentic and not subject to external
motivations. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS
(1785) (H.J. Paton trans., Harper Torchbooks 1964). By this conception, a
preference for sweet food is an external rather than internal preference (of the body
and not of the mind). In contrast, Hume argued that as a purely empirical matter,
we can't talk about any preferences being authentic or essential to a person. DAVID
HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 293-96 (1740) (Dover Publications 2003).
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choose her way of life, even when those choices impair her
welfare.16 Thus, a person's preference to smoke should be respected
regardless of the proven risks that preference subjects her to, and the
state should not intervene in her choice.
A different angle to this argument is that interfering in people's
preferences infantilizes them.17 Rather than being instigated by
mental evolution and growth or a simple learning process, the
changes to people’s preferences will be the outcome of the state’s
paternalistic intervention. Commonly raised regarding paternalistic
intervention in behavioral choices,18 this objection is no less valid—
if not more so—when preferences are at stake. In the case of
smoking, for instance, there is much merit to smokers’ undergoing a
process of realizing that their smoking preferences are detrimental to
their wellbeing and changing them accordingly. When the state
assumes responsibility for detecting and changing such preferences,
individuals may be led into a state of atrophy.19
A second argument against preferences changing by the state
centers on the abuse of power concern. According to this argument,
since political power is always coercive and backed by the state's
ability to impose sanctions,20 the state is likely to exploit its power to

16

See Amartya Sen, Markets and Freedoms: Achievements and Limitations of the
Market Mechanism in Promoting Individual Freedoms, 45 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS
519, 524 (1993). Sen takes the “process aspect of freedom” to include decisional
autonomy and immunity from interference. The former, he stresses, “is concerned
with the operative role that a person has in the process of choice … . [T]he crucial
issue here is self-decision, e.g., whether the choices are being made by the person
herself-not (on her behalf) by other individuals or institutions.” Id.
17
Cf. Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and Economics:
Its Origins, Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1033,
1070-71 (2012) (arguing that paternalistic intervention in individual decisionmaking "tends to infantilize the public").
18
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Choosing Not to Choose, 64 DUKE L.J. 1, 30-36
(2014) (debating the merits of learning as an advantage for active choosing over
paternalistic approaches); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY NUDGE? 94-96 (2014)
(presenting the objection to soft paternalism on the grounds of possible public
infantilization). Paternalistic policies are also seen as diminishing the expressive
function of law. Although norms and behaviors can be shaped simply through the
authoritative statements of the law, a paternalistic approach prefers that the law
operate in the background, unbeknownst to its targets. See Yuval Feldman & Orly
Lobel, Behavioural Trade-Offs: Beyond the Land of Nudges Spans the World of
Law and Psychology, in NUDGE AND THE LAW: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 301,
314-17 (Alberto Alemanno & Anne-Lise Sibony eds., 2015).
19
Cf. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 37 (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds.,
2003) ("The mental and moral, like the muscular powers, are improved only by
being used.").
20
RAWLS, supra note 11, at 136 (discussing the features of political power within
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change people's preferences in a way that serves its own interests
rather than those of the individuals.21 Such changes should, therefore,
be prohibited or, at the very least, strictly limited. This argument is a
derivative of the basic idea that the ruler's authority should always be
limited given the danger that it will try to capture more than its fair
share of the “good.”22 This concern also arises with respect to
paternalistic intervention by the state in general, 23 and it has even
greater force regarding preferences: intervention in preferences is
analogous to subordinating citizens to the will of the monarch
through brainwashing and similar techniques.
In abusing its power, the state could be internally motivated by
the interests and views of the policymaker herself. Such would be the
case, for example, when a conservative administration promotes prolife preferences or a liberal administration promotes pro-choice
preferences regardless of how such a change could impact social
welfare. The state’s motivation could also, however, be externally
driven, the product of the lobbying of a non-governmental actor.24
This would be the case when a fast-food corporation uses its political
clout to promote a change in people's taste preferences, thereby
benefiting itself at the expense of the public good. What is
troublesome, in other words, is that efforts to change preferences
would not be unilateral, with the state the sole initiator of the change,
but rather bilateral or multilateral, with interest groups seeking to
change the social planner's preferences,25 who, in turn, would
constitutional regimes).
21
There are any number of alternatives for intervening in people's preferences.
Some would be more objectionable than others because of the risk of abuse of the
state’s power. See infra Part III. Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 3, famously
advocated intervening in people's behavior (not preferences!) through "nudging."
This suggestion has drawn some criticism, to which Sunstein has attempted to
respond in SUNSTEIN, WHY NUDGE?, supra note 18, at 12. See also Ayala Arad &
Ariel Rubinstein, The People's Perspective on Libertarian-Paternalistic Policies
(July 2015) (unpublished manuscript), available at www.tau.ac.il/~aradayal/LP.pdf
(showing that individuals might counter-react to a nudge from the state by doing
the opposite of what is expected of them).
22
John Finnis, Is Natural Law Theory Compatible with Limited Government?, in
NATURAL LAW, LIBERALISM AND MORALITY 1, 2 (1996) (discussing the
justification for limited government).
23
MILL, supra note 19, at 143-44 (arguing that intervention in a person's life is
justified only when she inflicts harm on others).
24
A similar concern has been raised as an objection to soft paternalism. The State
Is
Looking
After
You,
ECONOMIST
(Apr
6th
2006),
http://www.economist.com/node/6772346.
25
See Mingli Zheng, Lobbying for Wealth Redistribution by Changing the Social
Planner’s Preferences, 26 J. THEORETICAL POL. 79, 79-92 (2013) (modelling the
effects of interest group lobbying on a framework for changing the social planner’s
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implement policies that impose those preferences on the public.
In the common abuse-of-power scenario, there would be a
"slippery slope,"26 where the state gradually eases its restraint and
intensifies its intervention for the sole purpose of furthering its own
objectives and interests. There are two ways in which this could
happen: through an intensification of means, whereby the state
unnecessarily and disproportionately shifts from soft to harsh
intervention or, alternatively, resorts to progressively-less-visible
means of persuasion;27 or through an intensification of scope,
whereby the state begins to take avenues of intervention initially
deemed excessively pervasive or offensive, such as intervention in
sexual preferences.
The concerns regarding state overreach are exacerbated by the
lack of transparency that intervention policies tend to suffer from.
Coercive forms of intervention28 can be expected to be conducted in
public view; this would be the case, for instance, with the prohibition
of an activity that is intended to impact private preferences to engage
in that activity. However, subtler and softer forms of intervention29
might not be publicly visible, as their effectivity hinges on a certain
degree of ambiguity. Sunlight has been called the best of
disinfectants,30 so it is clear why already-suspect intervention
intensifies concerns when performed behind the veil of opacity. Even
a state that severely infringes on civil rights and acts against the will
of its people cannot be held accountable if its actions aren’t subject
to proper public scrutiny.31
A third argument, which is related to the second one, focuses on

preferences).
26
See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 236-38, who debate a similar
slippery-slope objection in the context of state intervention in people's behavior.
For an example of such an objection, see Douglas Glen Whitman & Mario J.
Rizzo, Paternalistic Slopes, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 411 (2007), reviewing and
analyzing the relationship between the slippery-slope argument and paternalist
policymaking.
27
See Riccardo Rebonato, A Critical Assessment of Libertarian Paternalism, 37 J.
CONSUMER POL'Y 357, 368-69 (2014) (applying the slippery-slope argument to the
possibility of modes of influence becoming less overt).
28
Infra Sections III.A-B.
29
Infra Sections III.C-D.
30
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, What Publicity Can Do, in OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND
HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 62, 62 (1914) (Harper Torchbooks 1967).
31
For a discussion of publicity concerns in the context of soft paternalism, see
SUNSTEIN, WHY NUDGE, supra note 18, at 144-51. See also Edward L. Glaeser,
Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 151-52 (2006) (objecting to
soft paternalism due to the greater difficulty of monitoring it as compared to hard
paternalism).
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the role of the state. Per this argument, the state should take a neutral
stance on people’s preferences.32 The main justification for this is
that people have many different and, at times, conflicting
conceptions of what constitutes the “good," and the state's traditional
role of promoting the good cannot encompass all of those
conceptions.33 Accordingly, under liberal political theory, the state's
role should be limited to protecting and enforcing the most
fundamental civil liberties and political rights, producing public
goods, and enabling all individuals to pursue their own conceptions
of the good.34 It is the state’s duty, therefore, to set the boundaries
within which individuals live their lives and guarantee the conditions
necessary for them to fulfill their hopes and ambitions as they see
fit.35
Given this, the state should not determine which preferences are
the “right” ones for individuals and intervene to promote them, even
if this would not be an abuse of its power. For example, a particular
group within the state might impose conservative dress codes on its
members as part of its religious ideology, while other groups might
strongly oppose this norm as oppressive. Under the logic of the role
of the state argument, the state should not interfere with the former
group's preferences or actions even if positive utility effects can be
expected from this intervention, for it would be akin to depriving
religious freedom and preferring a progressive notion of the "good"
over a conservative one.
The fourth and last argument relates to uncertainty: it is often
unclear whether the state's intervention in preferences would actually
increase and not decrease social welfare. This argument tends to be
supported by both economists and legal economists.36 In constructing

32

RAWLS, supra note 11, at 133-211 (explaining that the state ought not to
privilege one conception of good over another).
33
RAWLS, supra note 11, at 134-36, 191-92.
34
JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 172-73 (1st ed. 1921) (1999) (discussing the
basic liberties the state should protect).
35
Allen E. Buchanan, Assessing the Communitarian Critique of Liberalism, 99
ETHICS 852, 854 (1989) (defining the proper role of the state under liberal political
theory); Richard B. Stewart, Regulation in a Liberal State: The Role of NonCommodity Values, 92 YALE L.J. 1537, 1539 (1983). But see Joseph Raz,
Liberalism, Autonomy, and the Politics of Neutral Concern, 7 MIDWEST STUD.
PHIL. 89, 116 (1982), who differentiates between taking coercive measures against
morally unacceptable activities (which he rejects) and fostering positive ideas
while suppressing the conditions that make negative ideas appealing (which he
supports).
36
LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 413-31 (2002)
(suggesting that changing undesirable preferences might be welfare-enhancing and
discussing the problems with identifying such preferences).
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their models, economists commonly assume preferences to be a
given and exogenous (i.e., not shaped through state intervention).
While primarily motivated by a desire to simplify a rather
complicated model, this assumption rests on the premise that it is too
difficult to predict how intervention would change individuals’
preferences. The resulting conclusion is that the state should not
intervene in preferences, since intervention cannot be justified if we
cannot predict the outcome.
But there is another dimension to the uncertainty argument: if
the state's goal is to maximize the satisfaction of existing
preferences, there is no need to measure the utility people derive
from their preferences. It is sufficient that the preferences are
satisfied, since more satisfaction means more utility, or welfare, and
that is all that matters. Yet this is not so when the state's goal is to
change preferences in order to increase social welfare: here the state
should measure the utilities of existing preferences, compare them
with the utilities of the potential preferences, and decide accordingly
whether the change is worth pursuing. Measuring utilities and
conducting the necessary comparisons could be a formidable task for
the state.37 Therefore, even if we could resolve the uncertainty about
the change that the state's intervention in preferences would bring
about, the uncertainty as to whether that change would be good or
bad would still remain.38
***
The four objections to intentional preferences change by the
state discussed above are not without merit. They can explain the
resistance of many economists and moral philosophers to the idea
that changing preferences can sometimes be a desirable intermediate
stage on the way to maximizing social welfare. Part II below now
proceeds to identify categories of cases in which some of these
objections collapse or at least are less compelling than usual.

37

Cf. Glaeser, supra note 31, at 151 (arguing against soft paternalism on grounds
of expected errors).
38
Cf. Jeremy Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries and a Fragment on
Government, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 393 (J.H. Burns &
H.L.A. Hart eds., 1977). Bentham argues that a person's happiness is valued
according to her balance of pleasure and pain. Therefore, the state bears a duty to
increase the amount of pleasure for the greatest number of people. Mill, who
distinguished between higher and lower pleasures, argued that higher pleasures are
generally more intellectual than physical (for example, the pleasure in practicing
philosophy versus the pleasure derived from tasty food). JOHN STUART MILL,
UTILITARIANISM, at ch. 2 (1861) (Oskar Piest ed., Bobbs-Merrill 1957).
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II. WHEN OBJECTIONS TO STATE INTERVENTION LOSE FORCE
There are various ways in which preferences are first acquired
and then subsequently altered. Some preferences can be changed by
the preference holder himself, with or without the assistance of
others; other preferences are difficult to change without state
intervention. Some preferences have almost no external effects on
third parties, while others do. Some preferences do not truly, in a
deep sense, constitute preferences, whereas others are genuine
preferences. Finally, some preferences relate to people's identity and
personality, and others are peripheral. These variations in preferences
are relevant to whether intentional state and law intervention to
change them is desirable. This part will respond to this question by
identifying cases, or conditions, in which intervention might be
justified.
A. Adverse Effects on Others
A common justification for the state and the law to intervene in
people's behavior is when it adversely affects other people's interests.
This is the rationale for tort law, for example.39 Likewise, in contract
law, the imposition of negative externalities on third parties is a
common justification for intervening in contracts: a contract will be
found unenforceable on public policy grounds when it can negatively
affect third parties or society at large.40 In addition, a common
justification for regulations is the need to restrain activities that put
third parties at risk.41
The possibility of preferences’ creating negative externalities for
third parties undermines the objection to state intervention. Clearly,
the risk of negative externalities per se would not necessarily be a
sufficient condition for intervening in the risk-creator's preferences,
just as this would not necessarily justify intervening in people's
behavior. Nevertheless, negative externalities are an important factor
when considering state intervention in both conduct and preferences.
There are two ways in which preferences might produce
negative externalities. First, some preferences could be transformed
into conduct that inflicts harm on third parties. Second, people with
39

DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 12 (2000).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 178-99 (1981).
41
See generally A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1932)
(proposing that externalities be remedied through regulation in the form of taxes);
Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest,
and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 168 (1990)
(describing the public interest theory of regulation, which views government
intervention as necessary to protect the public from the effects of externalities).
40
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certain undesirable preferences might "infect" others with those
preferences. In some cases, these two modes of externalization
converge: some preferences are both injurious and infectious. It is in
this latter type of cases that the objection to state and law
intervention becomes especially weak.
Arguably, the state and the law could wait to contend with the
externalization risk until it actually materializes. But as I will
demonstrate, the earlier the intervention, the more likely it is to be
both more effective and, ultimately, less burdensome for the
preference holder. To illustrate, consider racist preferences: Imagine
that the law could alter these preferences in a positive direction.
Should it intervene to that effect? One possible response is that the
law, and the state, should ignore racist preferences so long as they do
not result in injury to third parties. Indeed, various laws prohibiting
racist incitement condition legal intervention on injurious effects on
third parties or at least an imminent risk of such injury.42
Arguably, however, this is not enough. To begin with, racist
preferences could result in injurious conduct that is difficult or even
impossible to detect: it is completely implausible that anyone who
acts in a racially discriminatory way towards others will be brought
to trial. Second and more importantly, racist preferences are
infectious and epidemic;43 infection is bad on its own but much
worse when it exacerbates the risk of injury to third parties. Thus,
racist parents are likely to infect their children with their racist
preferences, as are racist teachers likely to infect their pupils. Racist
leaders might infect their supporters with their preferences, as might
cultural icons. In fact, anyone with racist preferences is likely to
infect others. So while it is possible to refrain from intervention until
actual injury (or "infection") occurs, prior intervention to change
racist preferences—particularly when held by people who tend to
wield influence over others—will often be much more effective than
at the later stage. How such intervention can be accomplished is a
different question altogether and will be discussed in Part III.
State intervention in people's preferences to prevent injury to
42

See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1147 (arguing for the injurious effects of
discriminatory preferences even when the injured party seems content with the
status quo).
43
See, e.g., Bobbie Harro, The Cycle of Socialization, in READINGS FOR DIVERSITY
AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 15, 15-18 (Maurianne Adams et al. eds., 2000) (discussing
how personal identities and views, particularly oppressive and prejudiced opinions,
are shaped by one's parents and the institutions one attends); Jeff Greenberg &
Tom Pyszczynski, The Effect of an Overheard Ethnic Slur on Evaluations of the
Target: How to Spread a Social Disease, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 61
(1985) (showing that ethnic slurs cue prejudiced behavior in those who are
exposed to them).
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third parties is not only essential for replacing existing "undesirable"
preferences with “desirable” ones but also for creating completely
new preferences. Take the example of the preference for order.
Sometimes this preference can do more harm than good, especially if
it becomes obsessive or impairs discretion.44 Yet sometimes this
preference is crucial. In the military or in the framework of risky
activities, preference for order could save lives. It is no coincidence
that armies consistently strive to instill this preference in their
soldiers. In this context, too, it could be argued that armies should
focus on the injurious effects of disorder rather than on fostering a
preference for order. However, the risk that a lack of preference for
order (or a preference for disorder) will spread and infect others and
result in irreparable harms justifies creating a preference for order
amongst soldiers (up to a certain point, of course) even prior to the
occurrence of injury to third parties. The early stages of this process
could be considered a change to an external preference,45 since
soldiers prefer order because of the threat of punishment from their
superiors. But its ultimate goal is a change of an internal preference,
through the development of personal characteristics independent of
external incentives or threats.
Thus far, we have seen that intervention in preferences by the
state and the law would be more effective at preventing negative
externalities to third parties if it were carried out prior to the actual
infliction of harm. But no less significant is the fact that early
intervention can be less burdensome or less costly for the preference
holder. To understand this, assume that the state seeks to prevent
smoking in public places so as to protect third parties from passive
smoking. One way to accomplish this would be to prohibit smoking
in public places and impose sanctions on violators. Another way,
however, would be to change smokers' preferences so that they
would cease to prefer to smoke.46 Not only would the latter solution

44

See, e.g., Emel Arslan, An Investigation of Social Skills in Children with
Different Perfectionism Levels, 6 EDUC. RES. & REV. 279, 281 (2011) (arguing that
perfectionist individuals, who tend to be excessively organized, suffer from
distressed and unsatisfying lives); Jerald Kay & Deborah Y. Liggan, Diagnosis
and Treatment of Personality Disorders, 4 PSYCHIATRY BOARD REV. MANUAL 1, 7
(2000) ("Persons with obsessive-compulsive personality disorder are excessively
organized, neat and conscientious. These traits impair the individual's functioning
because attention to detail is so excessive or time-consuming that the point of the
activity is lost.").
45
Supra Section II.A.
46
See Bryan Norton et al., The Evolution of Preferences: Why “Sovereign”
Preferences May Not Lead to Sustainable Policies and What to Do About It, 24
ECOLOGY ECON. 193, 205-06 (1998) (debating the concept of discouraging
preferences for smoking to advance the social goal of ensuring a healthy
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be more effective in attaining the state’s goal but it could also reduce
or even eliminate the costs to smokers of quitting smoking.47 For any
smoker who would retain a weak preference for smoking, light
sanctions would suffice to deter him from satisfying that preference
in public places.48
Exemplifying well the advantages of early intervention is the
context of environmental preservation.49 Here, changing preferences
might be not only the more effective way to achieve this goal but
also less costly for the individuals required to act to preserve the
environment. Sex offenders are another, albeit very different,
example. In some countries, sex offenders such as pedophiles are
offered the option of medical treatment that will alter (or suppress)
their sexual preferences instead of serving a long jail sentence.50
While coercive medical treatment is strongly objected to, this
opposition diminishes if the offender agrees to the treatment
voluntarily.51 But regardless of one’s moral stance on medical
treatment as an alternative to a jail sentence, it is fairly indisputable
that treatment is often the less burdensome option for the offender.
Clearly, however, state intervention in preferences is not
justified in all instances in which the relevant preferences could
impose negative externalities on others. In addition to the potential
infringement on the individual’s freedom, the state's intervention
could have other negative effects. Many potentially injurious
preferences have positive aspects that would be lost were those
preferences changed. While a preference of aggressiveness could
population); Christina Rasco, Discouraging Smoking: Interventions for Pediatric
Nurse Practitioners, 6 J. PEDIATRIC HEALTH CARE 200 (1992) (outlining methods
for discouraging adolescent smoking).
47
Changing preferences would also suppress smokers' desire to smoke in private
places, which would be for their own good. At the same time, some smokers might
prefer to retain their preferences to smoke and engage in smoking in private places.
48
See Levinson-Zamir, supra note 13, at 67 (changing preferences might infringe
on autonomy less than interference in behavior).
49
Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J. LEGAL
STUD. 217 (1993) (presenting the preferences change effects of environmental
regulation).
50
It could be argued, however, that the medical treatment does not truly change
their preferences but only inhibits their satisfaction.
51
See Karen Harrison, The High-Risk Sex Offender Strategy in England and
Wales: Is Chemical Castration an Option?, 46 HOWARD J. 16, 19 (2007)
(discussing objections to surgically castrating offenders and noting that this
practice is offensive when performed against the offender’s will); John McMillan,
The Kindest Cut? Surgical Castration, Sex Offenders and Coercive Offers, J. MED.
ETHICS 1 (2013) (discussing the validity of sex offenders’ consent to undergoing
castration and concluding that it should not be viewed as cruel or inhumane
treatment when no coercion is involved).
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impose negative externalities on others, it might, at the same time,
offer social benefits, for example, for the military, which cannot
function without aggressive soldiers.52
B. Market Forces
Market forces shape people's preferences on a daily basis.53
Underlying these forces is the desire of merchants to maximize their
profits rather than enhance social welfare. In fact, market forces
could certainly operate to enhance social welfare. But because of
information asymmetries, consumer irrationality, or the inability of
consumers to organize to promote their collective interests,54 market
forces tend to change consumer preferences in a way that serves
merchants' rather than consumers' interests.55
To understand this, let us return to the smartphone example. For
many people, smartphones create a preference to be in continuous
social contact.56 Merchants have an obvious interest in shaping such
a preference: the more people who have these phones, the more other
people buy them and related applications and accessories, and the
stronger people’s preference to be connected. Needless to say, the
big winners are inevitably the merchants. Merchants have a similar
self-evident interest to foster consumer preferences to over52

Of course, in an ideal world, there are no armies and there is no need for
soldiers' aggressiveness. Yet it is questionable whether zero aggressiveness is what
we want to have even in an ideal world.
53
See generally DAVID GEORGE, PREFERENCE POLLUTION: HOW MARKETS
CREATE THE DESIRES WE DISLIKE (2004) (analyzing how the market influences
preferences and how this contributes, if at all, to efficiency).
54
OREN BAR-GIL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND
PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS 17 (2013) (presenting the notion of market
failure in consumer markets).
55
See RONALD J. SCHINDLER, THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL CRITIQUE OF CAPITALIST
CULTURE 133-34 (1998), explaining the relationship between capitalist ideology
and individuals' false consciousness regarding their true needs. According to the
Frankfurt School thinkers, capitalism has created false human needs that induce
greater consumption.
56
See, e.g., A Nation Addicted to Smartphones, OFCOM (Aug. 4, 2011),
http://consumers.ofcom.org.uk/news/a-nation-addicted-to-smartphones (presenting
various indicators of smartphone addiction in the UK, such as the finding that a
vast majority of users have their phones switched on all the time, even when in
bed); Elizabeth Anderson, Teenagers Spend 27 Hours a Week Online: How
Internet Use Has Ballooned in the Last Decade, THE TELEGRAPH (May 11, 2015),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/mediatechnologyandtelecoms/di
gital-media/11597743/Teenagers-spend-27-hours-a-week-online-how-internet-usehas-ballooned-in-the-last-decade.html ("People are spending twice as much time
online compared to 10 years ago, fuelled by increasing use of tablets and
smartphones.").
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consume.57 As with smartphones, consumers are incapable of
organizing to prevent the cultivation of these new and not necessarily
desirable preferences, making merchants free to do whatever will
advance their interests.
Addiction is particularly illustrative of this phenomenon:
merchants and manufacturers strive to make their products addictive
for consumers,58 with cigarettes, alcohol, and drugs the most obvious
examples. As we will see below,59 addiction is a sub-category of a
broad class of cases in which people have a second-order preference
(to avoid drugs, for example) about a first-order preference (to
consume drugs). In such instances, state intervention to change firstorder preferences could be justified regardless of whether they were
produced by market forces or created in a different way.
A final example comes from the world of modeling. Modeling
agencies notoriously demand of their models, especially female ones,
to maintain a low weight even if harmful to their health.60 The
economic motivation behind this is the notion that clothing looks
best on thin models. This serves to cultivate in many young girls,
who are exposed to these images of thin models, a narrow perception
of beauty and a strong preference for thinness, to the point of
anorexia in extreme cases.61

57

See Hans Kjellberg, Market Practices and Over-Consumption, 11 CONSUMPTION
MKT. & CULTURE 151, 151-52 (2008), for a review of prominent studies on how
marketing activities affect consumption, see B. Wansink & S.B. Park, At the
Movies: How External Cues and Perceived Taste Impact Consumption Volume, 12
FOOD QUALITY & PREFERENCE 69 (2001) (showing that moviegoers consume
more popcorn than usual, regardless of tastiness, when served in a larger
container).
58
For the definition of addiction, see Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1158.
59
Infra Section C.
60
See, e.g., Antonio Preti et al., Eating Disorders Among Professional Fashion
Models, 159 PSYCHIATRY RES. 86 (2008) (finding that fashion models report
significantly more symptoms of eating disorders and are more commonly
underweight than members of a control group composed of girls of the same age
and social and cultural background); David M. Garner & Paul E. Garfinkel, SocioCultural Factors in the Development of Anorexia Nervosa, 10 PSYCHOL. MED. 647
(1980) (finding an overrepresentation of anorexia and excessive dieting concerns
among dance and modelling students and hypothesizing this to be the result of
pressure to be slim and of achievement expectations).
61
See, e.g., Hayley K. Dohnt & Marika Tiggemann, Body Image Concerns in
Young Girls: The Role of Peers and Media Prior to Adolescence, 35 J. YOUTH &
ADOLESCENCE 141 (2006) (finding that body image concerns are relevant for girls
as young as five to eight years old and noting a correlation between dieting
awareness and exposure to magazines promoting thinness and attractiveness by
presenting underweight models); Daniel R. Anderson et al., Early Childhood
Television Viewing and Adolescent Behavior: The Recontact Study, 66
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The question that arises wherever market forces shape people's
preferences is why not allow the state to intervene to prevent the
preference-changing effects of the market or to restore the original
preferences if appropriate? Note that state intervention in such cases
would reverse effects imposed by third parties rather than create new
preferences. In all the contexts discussed above, it can be argued that
consumers made their own choices and that the state should stay out
of those choices. A strong counter-argument, however, is that when
merchants exploit consumers' ignorance, irrationality, and inability to
organize and shape their preferences so as to serve the merchants'
interests, state intervention through the law is justified no less than
when market failures facilitate consumer exploitation without
changing preferences.62
C. Preferences about Preferences
People often have second-order preferences regarding their firstorder preferences, and they need the state's or law’s assistance to
satisfy the second-order preferences.63 In those cases, intervention by
the state or the law could bring into a Pareto improvement: everyone
is made better off and no one is made worse off. A classic illustration
of the possible tension between first- and second-order preferences
can be drawn from Homer’s tale of Odysseus and the Sirens.64
Odysseus had a first-order preference to listen to the Sirens’ song,
but knew that this would lead him to his death. His second-order
preference was to live. In order to satisfy the latter preference,
Odysseus could have plugged his ears with beeswax, as his ship’s
crewmen did, and avoided hearing the Sirens’ song. Instead,
however, he came up with a plan that enabled him to enjoy the best
of both worlds: he had his crew tie him to the ship’s mast and
MONOGRAPHS SOC'Y FOR RES. CHILD DEV. 1, 116-17 (2001) (finding that viewing
entertainment television, where the ideal body type for women is represented by
slender fashion models and actresses, causes adolescent girls to develop a negative
body image and a desire to be thinner).
62
See Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Objectivity of Well-Being and the Objectives of
Property Law, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.1669, 1680-81 (2003), discussing ideal
preferences as opposed to actual preferences, which might be affected by mistakes
and lack of information. She suggests that arguably, ideal, rather than actual,
preferences should be respected since they express the actual preferences an
individual would have were she well-informed and could thoroughly deliberate all
possible alternatives.
63
Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1140 (explaining the preference about preference
phenomenon).
64
HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 146-47 (Walter Shewring trans., Oxford Univ. Press
1980) (c. 800 B.C.E.); JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES, at vi (1983); Sunstein, supra
note 11, at 1140.
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ordered them not to untie him even if he commands them to do so. In
this way, Odysseus was able to listen to the Sirens' song and stay
alive.
In contrast to its originality in the context of the ancient tale,
Odysseus’ solution manifests itself in many situations in the real
world. Anyone who has ever tried to lose weight or stop smoking, for
example, will recognize this. A person could have a first-order
preference to overeat or to smoke while, at the same time, a secondorder preference to avoid overeating or smoking.65 His second-order
preference often motivates him to take measures to prevent being
tempted by his first-order preference. Thus, a person who wants to
lose weight might refrain from bringing high-calorie food into his
home; likewise, a person trying to quit smoking might commit to
paying his family and friends a fine if he succumbs to the temptation
to smoke. Indeed, self-binding mechanisms can serve desirable
goals, and a person may be willing to adopt them if they can prevent
him from satisfying his undesirable (first-order) preferences.66
But when individuals are incapable of applying self-binding
mechanisms, the state could assist them in facilitating their secondorder preferences,67 by intervening to change their undesirable firstorder preferences. To illustrate, imagine that many people consume
drugs and cigarettes. Assume that most of them realize that they
would be better off were their preferences to change; in fact, they
might be quite happy were the state to intervene to effect this change.
Moreover, given the opportunity, they would perhaps even call on
the state to intervene. Under such circumstances, state intervention
65

See Jan Schnellenbach, Nudges and Norms: On the Political Economy of Soft
Paternalism, 28 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 266, 270 (2012) (explaining the concept of
meta-preferences, which are analogous to second-order preferences, with the
example of "a smoker who maximizes his short-term utility by surrendering to his
addiction, but whose meta-preferences are such that he would in fact prefer to be a
non-smoker"). For a supporting study, see Centers for Disease Control &
Prevention, Quitting Smoking Among Adults—United States, 2001–2010, 60
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1513, 1513 (2011) (analyzing data from
health interview surveys conducted between 2001-2010 and finding that in 2010,
68.8% of active adult smokers wanted to stop smoking).
66
First-order and second-order preferences should be distinguished from
conflicting preferences that the preference holder would try to balance between.
67
Michael Abramowicz & Ian Ayres, Commitment Bonds, 100 GEO. L.J. 605
(2011-2012) (presenting the notion of commitment-bond mechanisms that help
people or entities strongly bind themselves to their self-commitments); Saul
Levmore, Internality Regulation Through Public Choice, 15 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 451 (2014) (explaining the notion of self-binding regulation in the
context of health and safety); Saul Levmore, From Helmets to Savings and
Inheritance Taxes: Regulatory Intensity, Information Revelation, and Internalities,
81 U. CHI. L. REV. 229 (2014) (explaining self-binding regulations).
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could be justified.
Consider people's preferences to save and preferences to
consume. Many consume more and save less than what their secondorder preferences entail.68 How can the state help such individuals
satisfy their second-order preferences? One way would be to impose
mandatory rules to save more and consume less. However, a more
practical and effective way (but which would certainly generate
objections) would be to change the first-order preferences (to save
less and consume more) and thereby further the second-order
preferences (to save more and consume less).69
Sometimes individuals have second-order collective preferences
that clash with their first-order private preferences. Such a conflict
requires collective action, which is often unfeasible for individuals.
The state could solve this problem by changing their first-order
preferences and enabling the realization of their second-order
preferences.70 Take the case of organ donation. There is general
consensus that both society at large and every individual person
would be better-off were there widespread organ donation. Thus,
(almost) all people might have a collective preference for organ
donation but a private preference not to donate their own organs. If
people's private preferences regarding their own organ donation
could be changed by the state, this would be consistent with the
collective preferences of most people. But how could the state
accomplish this? One option is to change the default rule from "no
donation" to "donation." This arrangement, which allows people the
opportunity to opt-out of donating, has been adopted by several
countries and shown to increase organ donation dramatically.71 A
standard explanation for people's inclination not to opt-out of the
"donation" default rule is the natural human reluctance to face

68

See, e.g., James J. Choi et al., Defined Contribution Pensions: Plan Rules,
Participant Choices, and the Path of Least Resistance, in 16 TAX POLICY AND THE
ECONOMY 67, 72 (James M. Poterba ed., 2002) (finding that 68% of employees
report their actual savings rate to be too low compared to their ideal rate).
69
This is not the nudge that Thaler & Sunstein advocate. See infra Section III.D.
70
See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1140 (demonstrating the preference about
preference phenomenon in the context of consumption choices and suggesting how
to contend with it).
71
See Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 35 (2013-2014)
(showing that a default rule in favor of organ donation can increase significantly
people's willingness to be donors); Danyang Li et al., Increasing Organ Donation
via Changes in the Default Choice or Allocation Rule, 32 J. HEALTH ECON. 1117,
1117-29 (2013) (showing that the way policymakers frame the default rule
influences people’s attitudes towards organ donation); Eric Johnson & Daniel
Goldstein, Defaults and Donations Decisions, 78 TRANSPLANTATIONS 1713 (2004)
(same).
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matters related to death.72 An alternative (or perhaps supplementary)
explanation is that the “donation” default rule was embraced by the
public as a new norm and shaped people's first-order (private)
preferences to bring them closer to their second-order (collective)
preferences.73
D. Lack of Opportunities
It is strongly debated in many liberal democracies whether and
to what extent the state should respect the preferences of members of
minority groups not to be treated equally.74 In the Jewish orthodox
community, for example, women are often excluded from the public
sphere.75 Should the state intervene if it is convincingly shown that
most women in this community prefer such treatment, which liberal
communities consider illegitimate discrimination? A plausible
response is that the state should intervene regardless of the women's
own preferences since the intervention would bring about desirable
social change, which is more important than the women’s private
preferences. This claim could be supplemented by the paternalistic
assertion that this social change would, in the long-run, serve the
interests of the women who currently prefer to prevent the change
and even resist it.76
72

See Sunstein, supra note 71, at 34 (suggesting that we think about the problem in
terms of costs and benefits, for aside from the benefit to third parties, people tend
to consider only the emotional costs borne by those who choose to donate their
organs).
73
Cf. Oren Bar-Gill & Chaim Fershtman, Law and Preferences, 20 J. L. ECON.
ORG. 331, 332 (2004) ("The broad writing on the influence of legal policy on
norms and preferences has largely been founded on the symbolic or expressive
impact of law. If the law says that x is ‘bad’ (or illegal), then preferences will
ultimately adjust to devalue x; and conversely, if the law says that x is ‘good,’ then
preferences will adjust to value x.").
74
Menachem Mautner distinguishes between two central stances in the debate over
the liberal state's treatment of cultural practices of non-liberal groups living within
it. The first stance, whose proponents are referred to as "autonomy liberals," holds
that the state ought to be activist in its relations with these groups and instill
autonomy and other central liberal values in its members. The second stance,
whose proponents are referred to as "diversity liberals," prefers the value of
diversity to autonomy and therefore calls for "restraint" on the part of the state in
its relations with non-liberal groups. Menachem Mautner, From "Honor" to
"Dignity": How Should a Liberal State Treat Non-Liberal Cultural Groups?, 9
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 609, 610-11 (2008).
75
See Judith Romney Wegner, Status of Women in Jewish and Islamic Marriage
and Divorce Law, 5 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 19 (1982) (presenting several
examples of Jewish traditions relating to women's legal ability to perform social
roles in the public domain).
76
See Gila Stopler, Countenancing the Oppression of Women: How Liberals
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An alternative argument for state intervention would be that the
women’s preferences were shaped in a world offering very limited
opportunities to develop different preferences; or in other words,
these women adapted their preferences to the world into which they
were born.77 Therefore, their existing preferences should not be a
compelling consideration against social change, and there could be
particular justification for the state to intervene not only in conduct
but also in the women's preferences themselves.78
Preferences that are endogenous to the prevailing legal or social
order are quite common, and the exclusion of women in the Jewish
orthodox community is only one example. Another is the segregation
of Whites and Blacks in the United States up until about fifty years
ago.79 In this context too, it was claimed that segregation was
compatible with Black preferences at the time. This can also be
countered, however, with the argument that those preferences were
shaped in a world in which Blacks had very limited opportunities to
develop other preferences. Therefore, state intervention not only in
conduct but also in preferences should not be objected to.80
In other cases, it is not a lack of opportunities that produces
"problematic" preferences but the availability of bad opportunities.
For instance, the state’s indirect encouragement of the prostitution
industry is likely to lead some men to develop preferences for sex for
money. Here, state intervention to change preferences should clearly
be allowed, especially if those preferences are likely to adversely

Tolerate Religious and Cultural Practices That Discriminate against Women, 12
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 154, 184-89, 214-17 (2003), who questions the validity of
religious women's willing acquiescence to their own subjugation given the flaws in
their apparent consent; she calls on states to intervene in oppressive religious
practices using such measures as revoking financial support and instituting
mandatory education for gender equality.
77
Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1148 (discussing adaptive preferences).
78
The tale of the fox and the grapes is illustrative of the phenomenon of adaptive
preferences (ELSTER, supra note 64; Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1148). The fox,
unable to reach the grapes that he desired to eat, convinced himself that they were
sour and, as a consequence, ceased to desire them or, in other words, adapted his
preferences (although this might not be a preference change but a factual mistake).
79
Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1149 (explaining how Blacks long tended to shape
their preferences in accordance with the discriminatory status-quo).
80
The fox and the grapes tale (see supra note 78) is not applicable to the exclusion
of women and American racial segregation policy, for there is a substantive
difference between being deprived of the opportunity to eat grapes and being
deprived of the opportunity to live in dignity and equality. The latter is a social and
political problem of the utmost importance, and thus the argument for state
intervention is especially strong. Cf. JOSEPH RAZ, MORALITY OF FREEDOM 369-99
(1988) (justifying state intervention to enhance people's individual autonomy).
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affect others.81 But there is a more general argument to be made:
since any allocation of entitlements and resources in society affects
people's preferences82 and since the state shapes people's preferences
through these allocations, it is legitimate, in the appropriate
circumstances, for it to change those preferences, which it in fact
created.83 Applying this logic, the preference of Blacks, at a certain
point in time, to be segregated was a product of the racial segregation
and oppression imposed by the state for centuries. Why, then, should
the state not be permitted to rectify what it has done by changing
those preferences? Certainly, not all means of preferences change are
legitimate, and sometimes the change is unjustified even if it serves
an admirable goal. But the aim of this part of the article is simply to
suggest that in certain circumstances, the objection to preferences
change should be relaxed.
E. Lack of Information and Cognitive Limitations
There are also cases in which individuals do not lack sufficient
opportunities, but their lack of information and cognitive limitations
cause them to develop preferences they would not have developed
given full information and full rationality. From a certain
perspective, this category of cases is interrelated with the previous
category: whereas the latter relates to a lack of opportunities for
objective reasons, the present category involves a lack of
opportunities for subjective reasons.84
Let us return to the smoking example. In the past, many
individuals developed a preference to smoke because of a lack of
information. Had they known the health risks from the outset, they
might have refrained from smoking.85 Smoking also leads to
81

Supra Section II.A.
Consider the endowment effect: policymakers will find it hard to change the
status quo since people susceptible to the endowment effect will fight harder to
avoid the change than had they not been susceptible to this effect. See EYAL ZAMIR
& DORON TEICHMAN, BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 321 (2014).
83
Cf. Hanoch Dagan, Property’s Structural Pluralism: On Autonomy, the Rule of
Law, and the Role of Blackstonian Ownership, 3 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS.
CONF. J. 27, 33 (2014) (explaining that the state should recognize a sufficiently
diverse set of robust frameworks in property rights so that people can enjoy their
individual autonomy). For a similar argument in the context of contract law, see
HANOCH DAGAN & MICHAEL HELLER, A CHOICE THEORY OF CONTRACTS, at pt. III
(forthcoming 2016).
84
This category is related also to the category discussed in Section II.B. (Market
Forces): in both categories, preferences develop in a particular way because of
imperfections in the individual preference holders.
85
Plaintiffs in tobacco litigation commonly make the claim that the tobacco
companies are liable for damages caused by their products due to their failure to
82
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addiction, and addiction (at least when it is more psychological than
physical in nature) resembles a cognitive limitation: even though the
individual knows what is good for him, he is incapable of pursuing
that good. It might be similarly claimed that racist preferences are
also the product of a lack of information and cognitive limitations,86
although clearly such preferences are motivated by other factors as
well.87
The general argument being made here is that when preferences
developed due to a lack of information or cognitive limitations, the
objections to the state’s changing them lose much of their force. In
particular, the argument that preferences changing by the state would
inappropriately intervene in people's personality becomes less
compelling.88
F. The Collective Action Problem
The state often intervenes in the market when individuals fail to

disclose smoking-involved risks to customers. See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v.
Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Tex. 1997); Allgood v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 80 F.3d 168, 170 (5th Cir. Tex. 1996); Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 849 F.2d 230, 232 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1988). Indeed, data show that awareness of
health risks decreases smoking tendencies. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WHO
REPORT ON THE GLOBAL TOBACCO EPIDEMIC, 2011, at 14 (2011).
86
See JUDITH H. KATZ, WHITE AWARENESS: HANDBOOK FOR ANTI-RACISM
TRAINING 10 (2d ed. 2003) (noting the concept of "white privilege,” which is
"often invisible to those who possess it," as a predominant factor in modern racism
in the United States); Asa G. Hilliard, Foreword, in LOUISE DERMAN-SPARKS &
CAROL
BRUNSON
PHILLIPS,
TEACHING/LEARNING
ANTI-RACISM:
A
DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH, at xi, xii (1997) (explaining the importance of
education for mitigating racist tendencies).
87
See, for example, Michael Banton, The Nature and Causes of Racism and Racial
Discrimination, 7 INT'L SOC. 69, 77-78 (1992), who notes that exclusion, which is
often associated with territorial claims, can be a possible objective of racism, as a
group occupying a certain territory its members consider to be exclusively their
own could become hostile towards other groups settling on that same territory.
Banton also discusses stratification as a possible motivation behind racism, i.e., the
desire to maintain the subordinate status of members of another group. Scientific
models that were intended to account for biological differences among humans
and, accordingly, developed racial classifications are viewed as a predominant
cause of racism. See also Andreas Wimmer, Explaining Xenophobia and Racism:
A Critical Review of Current Research Approaches, 20 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD.
17 (1997), who discusses and refutes commonly raised explanations for racism and
focuses, instead, on the existence of a political struggle over who has the right to
be cared for by the state and society in times of intensified social conflict.
88
Cf. Mill, supra note 19, at 158 (when a person is about to cross a collapsing
bridge and is unaware of the risk, paternalistic intervention to save his life is
justified).
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take collective action that can be expected to improve their
wellbeing. To illustrate, one of the state’s most important roles is to
produce public goods.89 When every individual expecting to benefit
from the public good refuses to share in the costs of production,
hoping to free ride on other people's investments, collective action
becomes impossible and state intervention necessary.90 An analogical
situation warranting state intervention is when collective action is
necessary to change people's preferences, but they are incapable of
initiating this themselves. Such a need for collective action arises
when no individual finds it beneficial to change his preferences so
long as others do not do the same, and no one wants to be the first to
initiate the change. In such conditions, the only way to move the
group of individuals from one equilibrium to a new (perhaps better
and more efficient) one is for the state to intervene in their
preferences.91
Consider the preference to live in a traditionally structured
family unit.92 Satisfying this preference depends substantially on the
preferences of others: so long as the majority of other people have
this preference, developing a preference not to live in a family unit at
89

Pure public goods are characterized by the inability to exclude people from
consuming them ("non-excludability") and by the inability of one person's
consumption to detract from or prevent another person's consumption ("nonrivalry"). See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 128-29 (3d
ed. 2000).
90
Paul Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 R. ECON. & STAT.
387 (1954); Paul Samuelson, Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public
Expenditure, 37 R. ECON. & STAT. 350 (1955) (discussing the market's ability to
provide public goods); Paul Samuelson, Aspects of Public Expenditure Theories,
40 REV. ECON. & STAT. 332 (1958) (discussing market provision of public goods);
STIGLITZ, supra note 89, at 129 (explaining how non-excludability and non-rivalry
result in market failure).
91
Compare this to the category of cases in which market forces shape the
preferences of consumers who cannot organize to take collective action against
those effects. In such circumstances, state intervention could be justified to
contend with the collective action problem. Supra Section II.B.
92
Empirical data from research conducted in the U.S. show that while the
popularity of traditional family structures (namely, marriage) is declining, they are
still aspired-to by the majority of Americans. See, e.g., Frank Newport & Joy
Wilke, Most in U.S. Want Marriage, but Its Importance Has Dropped, GALLUP
(Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/163802/marriage-importancedropped.aspx (finding that most Americans are either married or would like to be
married someday); Millennials in Adulthood, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Mar. 7,
2014),
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2014/03/07/millennials-in-adulthood/
(finding that 69% of millennials would like to marry); JERALD G. BACHMAN ET
AL., MONITORING THE FUTURE—QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES FROM THE NATION’S
HIGH SCHOOL SENIORS 50 (2014) (finding that having a good marriage and family
life is "extremely important" to 75.9% of high-school seniors).
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all or a preference to live as a non-traditional family runs counter to
every individual’s interest. Note that although this recalls the lack of
opportunities category of cases,93 here, what is problematic is that
each and every individual has a strong interest not to change his
preferences so long as other individuals don’t change their
preferences. Thus, whereas a lack of opportunities could be resolved
through state provision of the missing opportunities,94 in the present
category of cases, the state must attend to a collective action
problem.
It is quite unlikely that were the state to recognize only the
traditional family unit and even restrict the establishment of "new
families," individuals would develop a preference not to live as a
traditional family or in a family unit at all. This brings into question
the claim that the state’s recognition of alternative families is
unjustified because most people's preferences pull in the opposite
direction. Setting aside other important considerations for
recognizing new families, it should be noted that preferences against
the non-traditional family frameworks could be a product of the
existing legal and social order, which cannot change spontaneously.95
Only state intervention, through explicit recognition of nontraditional families, can induce people to change their seemingly
unalterable preferences or at least make them more tolerant and
accepting of such families.
One way to understand this category of cases is as a
manifestation of the conformism tendency and, perhaps, the herd
effect.96 People often have a tendency to do or think exactly as others
do or think, unhesitatingly. Sometimes defined as conservatism or
adherence to the status quo,97 this tendency is in fact driven by a
different logic: the mere fact that other people behave in a certain
way seems good reason to behave in the same way. The conformism
tendency could explain why people's preferences generally do not
change when they are relatively homogeneous and interdependent
with the preferences of others. State intervention might encourage
93

Supra Section II.D.
Infra Section III.D.
95
For a general analysis highlighting the inherent difficulties in changing the legal
order, which stem from the system's architecture, see Marc Galanter, Why the
"Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW &
SOC'Y REV. 95 (1974).
96
See Abhijit Banerjee, A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107 Q. J. ECON. 797
(1992) (explaining people's tendency to do what everyone else does). For further
analysis, see Ian Ayres & Joshua Mitts, Anti-Herding Regulation, 5 HARV. BUS. L.
REV. 1 (2015).
97
See Banerjee, supra note 96, at 802 (presenting the basic model of herd
behavior).
94
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outliers to step forward and enable, in the long run, a change in the
preferences of many other people. Interestingly, conformism and the
herd effect can operate to make state intervention quite effective: if
enough people change their preferences, a new, stable equilibrium
can emerge, from which deviations will be unlikely.
G. Existing versus Future Preferences
Up to this point, we have discussed cases in which state
intervention could change existing preferences. But consider now
cases in which such intervention could prevent new preferences from
forming. Let’s return to the case of smoking: it is one thing to
intervene in people's preferences to smoke and quite another to
intervene to prevent people from ever developing a preference to
smoke (for example, by prohibiting everyone born after 2005 from
smoking). Similarly, it is one thing to intervene in people's
preference for sweet or salty food, and quite another to intervene to
prevent such preferences from developing in the first place or from
intensifying.98

98

Compare this to the debate over whether it is appropriate to show the public
photographs or videos that visually depict the terrible consequences of smoking (or
road accidents). For examples of studies supporting the usage of graphic warning
labels on cigarette packets, see Ekant Veer & Tracy Rank, Warning! The
Following Packet Contains Shocking Images: The Impact of Mortality Salience on
the Effectiveness of Graphic Cigarette Warning Labels, 11 J. CONSUMER BEHAV.
225 (2012) (finding that when compared with text-only labels, shocking visual
warning labels on cigarette packets signiﬁcantly increase intentions to quit or to
not start smoking); Sunday Azagba & Mesbah F. Sharaf, The Effect of Graphic
Cigarette Warning Labels on Smoking Behavior: Evidence from the Canadian
Experience, 15 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. 708 (2013) (finding that graphic
warnings have a statistically significant effect on smoking prevalence and quit
attempts). For examples of opposing views, see the court ruling in R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2012), that FDA
requirements to include graphic warning labels on cigarette packets violate the
First Amendment; the court held that the "FDA has not provided a shred of
evidence—much less the ‘substantial evidence’ required by the APA—showing
that the graphic warnings will ‘directly advance’ its interest in reducing the number
of Americans who smoke." See also Robert A.C. Ruiter & Gerjo Kok, Letter to the
Editor, Saying Is Not (Always) Doing: Cigarette Warning Labels Are Useless, 15
EUR. J. PUB. HEALTH 329 (2003) (questioning the existing evidence in favor of
warning labels and arguing that these labels generate counterproductive defensive
reactions); David M. Erceg-Hurn & Lyndall G. Steed, Does Exposure to Cigarette
Health Warnings Elicit Psychological Reactance in Smokers?, 41 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCH. 219 (2011) (finding that that graphic anti-smoking warnings can elicit
maladaptive psychological responses, namely, reactance, a motivation to restore
freedom by, for example, rebelling against the mitigating force). It can be argued
that these means are appropriate at least when directed at non-smokers in order to
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***
In the categories of cases discussed in this part, state
intervention in people’s preferences can be justified at least to some
extent. But what forms of intervention would be legitimate? In Part
III below, four modes of state intervention in people's preferences
will be presented, each varying in terms of pervasiveness and
intensity, on the one hand, and the identity of their addressees, on the
other.
III. DIFFERENT MODES OF INTERVENTION
As noted, the ways in which the state intervenes in people's
preferences can differ in pervasiveness and intensity. On the one
hand, state intervention can be coercive (for example, when the state
imposes duties on specific parties) and, on the other hand, it can be
soft (like when the state transmits educational messages). The
intervention can also differ in terms of its addressee: it could address
third parties who can affect people's preferences (indirect
intervention), or it could address the preference holders themselves
(direct intervention).
This Part discusses four different modes of state intervention,
categorized according to intensity and addressees: coercive-direct,
coercive-indirect, soft-direct, and soft-indirect.
A. Coercive and Direct
The most extreme form of intervention in preferences occurs
when the state forces individuals to change their preferences. While
it would be an understatement to say that such intervention is
undesirable, it could, nonetheless, be an option in some very rare
cases. Consider, again, a sex offender, who poses a high risk to
women. Say he consents to undergo medical treatment that will
change his sexual preferences in return for mitigation of his sentence.
In such extreme circumstances, state intervention might warrant
serious consideration.99
Another prevention option—which would likely trigger less
opposition—is to change people’s preferences by coercing them into
changing their behavior. Cognitive psychology research has shown
that when people are forced to change their behavior, particularly by

deter them from smoking.
99
It is questionable, however, whether this intervention is really about changing
preferences and not about preventing their satisfaction.
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way of light sanctions, they may also eventually change their
preferences.100 Thus, imposing a light sanction for smoking could be
an effective means of changing people’s preference to smoke. 101 In
Part II, we saw that a lack of appropriate opportunities prevents
people from developing certain preferences because they adapt their
preferences to the available opportunities.102 To extend this claim, if
people lack the opportunity to smoke (assuming they are law-abiding
citizens), then presumably they will adapt their preferences and
abandon any preference to smoke.
The reverse is also possible, however: sometimes the
unavailability of opportunities can intensify rather than repress
preferences or simply have no effect on them at all.103 The U.S.
Prohibition era is illustrative of this phenomenon. The ban on selling,
manufacturing, importing, and transferring alcohol104 did not alter
people’s preferences to consume alcohol, but quite the contrary: for
many, it in fact intensified those preferences.105 In contrast, for
people who have yet to develop such preferences (e.g., people who
are only potential alcohol consumers or potential smokers),
eliminating the opportunities to consume alcohol or to smoke could
be a very effective way to prevent those preferences from ever
forming.106
B. Coercive and Indirect
As noted, consumers' preferences are often shaped by market
forces. Preferences for over-consumption and preferences for being
in constant social contact are just two examples that illustrate how
merchants use their power to change people's preferences to serve
merchants’, rather than consumers', interests.107 One way for the
state to intervene in consumers' preferences is to restrain the market
forces and their effect on those preferences. Accordingly, when
merchants engage in tactics that are likely to radically change
100

See Lewinson-Zamir, supra note 13, at 58 (arguing that mild sanctions are
likely to reinforce voluntary compliance).
101
See Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 3, at 232 (explaining how small nudges can
help people quit smoking).
102
Supra Section II.D.
103
Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1143 (explaining how banning consumption of a
certain undesirable good could induce people to make even worse choices).
104
The National Prohibition Act, 41 STAT. 305 (1919).
105
Jack S. Blocker, Did Prohibition Really Work?, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 233,
238 (2006) (presenting the effects of the National Prohibition Act on Americans'
drinking habits).
106
Supra Section II.G.
107
Supra Section II.B.
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consumers’ preferences, the state should treat the merchants’ motives
with suspicion and intervene in the appropriate cases, just as it does
when merchants exploit consumers' lack of information, irrationality,
or inability to organize themselves. This is indirect, albeit coercive
intervention since it is directed not at the preference holders but at
those who could shape the preferences.
Another type of coercive indirect intervention arises when the
state addresses third parties and directs them to create, or not to
inhibit, opportunities108 that are essential for new preferences to
develop. Take, for example, the resistance of ultra-orthodox Jews to
liberal arts and science studies for their children.109 This attitude is
probably a manifestation of the parents’ genuine preference to avoid
exposure to secular studies; this, in turn, is likely the product of the
lack of opportunities in their communities,110 the social structure into
which they are locked from birth, or the values they were instilled
with in their community.111 The state could intervene by forcing the
108

Supra Section II.D.
For a brief historical account of the attitude within ultra-orthodox Jewish
communities towards secular studies, see JACOB LUPU, NEW DIRECTIONS IN
HAREDI SOCIETY IN ISRAEL: VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND ACADEMIC STUDIES 1012 (2005). For current objections, see, e.g., David Rosenberg, New York UltraOrthodox Are Following Israel's Bad Example, HAARETZ (Nov. 26, 2014),
http://www.haaretz.com/blogs/david-s-harp/.premium-1.628581
(describing
parents’ objections to an attempt to promote general education studies such as
English and math in ultra-orthodox New York schools); Ronny Linder-Ganz, New
Generation of Ultra-Orthodox Men Going from Religious to Nursing Studies,
HAARETZ (Jun. 2, 2015), http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/business/.premium1.659011 (describing the barriers to entering the labor force for ultra-orthodox
Jews due to the stress on religious studies in the ultra-orthodox community, which
results in the discontinuation of math and English studies at a very young age).
110
See, e.g., Jeremy Sharon, Haredi Yeshiva with Radical Agenda to Provide High
School, Higher Education Courses, JERUSALEM POST (June 28, 2015),
http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Haredi-yeshiva-with-radical-agenda-to-providehigh-school-higher-education-courses-407347 (discussing the lack of exposure to
secular studies within the ultra-orthodox Jewish community and discussing
examples of adolescents who have had no access to such knowledge in the
community's education system for many years).
111
See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 109 (suggesting that a reason for ultraorthodox Jews' resistance to a conventional career path could be their common
prioritization of religious requirements over conventional cost-benefit analysis, as
is evident in the high birthrate in the community); LUPU, supra note 109, at 11
("The right to study Torah for its own sake became an overriding obligation,
pushing aside the concern for material well-being."); Jeremy Sharon, Shteinman:
No Secular Studies in Haredi Education, JERUSALEM POST (May 7, 2013),
http://www.jpost.com/Jewish-World/Jewish-News/Shteinman-No-secular-studiesin-haredi-education-312302 (citing a prominent spiritual leader in the Jewish ultraorthodox world who vehemently opposes secular studies).
109
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parents to provide their children with secular instruction, in the hope
that this will change the parents’ preferences in the long run. This
would be coercive and direct intervention in people's preferences.
Alternatively, the state could force the community’s religious leaders
or institutions to make secular studies available to its members.112
Eventually, more and more members of the community would be
exposed to such studies and change their preferences accordingly.
This would constitute coercive but indirect intervention in people's
preferences: it would not be coercive towards the preference holders
but, rather, towards those who can impact their preferences.
C. Soft and Direct
Soft and direct state intervention in people's preferences is the
most common form of intervention. Education, in which the state is
often an active player, shapes values and changes preferences.113 The
law, as an agent of the state, sometimes performs an expressive and
educational function.114 Constitutions shape value preferences (for
equality, dignity, etc.), as do court decisions occasionally.115 And as
some commentators have noted, criminal law has an expressive
function too.116 Take, for example, laws prohibiting sexual
112

See LUPU, supra note 109, at 50, who discusses the strong impact of religious
leaders' views regarding secular studies on the attitudes of their communities. For a
study demonstrating the influence of religious leaders in the ultra-orthodox Jewish
community on members’ personal decisions, see Kate Coleman-Brueckheimer et
al., Involvement of Rabbinic and Communal Authorities in Decision-Making by
Haredi Jews in the UK with Breast Cancer: An Interpretative Phenomenological
Analysis, 68 SOC. SCI. & MED. 323 (2009).
113
It is questionable whether educational intervention in preferences is necessarily
soft. In extreme cases, it will be more “brainwashing” than education.
114
See generally RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW
(2015) (discussing, among other things, how the law creates "focal points" and
reveals information to people and the courts).
115
See David A. Dana, The Law and Expressive Meaning of Condemning the Poor
After Kelo, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 365, 378 (2007) ("Laws do not simply, or only,
dictate what people and institutions are permitted or prohibited from doing. Laws
are also a part of the culture that helps form prevailing values and
understandings."); Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Foreword:
Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV.
4, 8 (2003) (arguing that "constitutional law and culture are locked in a dialectical
relationship, so that constitutional law both arises from and in turn regulates
culture," and defining "culture" as "the beliefs and values of nonjudicial actors");
Holly Doremus, Constitutive Law and Environmental Policy, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
295, 307-18 (2003) (discussing how the law reinforces and shapes values).
116
Alon Harel & Ariel Porat, Aggregating Probabilities Across Cases: Criminal
Responsibility for Unspecified Offenses, 94 MINN. L. REV. 261, 303-07 (2009)
(discussing the expressive justifications for criminal sanctions). See also Joel
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harassment in the workplace. On the one hand, these laws are
coercive: they prohibit certain types of behavior and ideally change
the preferences of harassers and potential harassers in the long run.117
Even more interesting, however, is that these laws can also affect the
preferences of people who are not harassers or potential harassers, by
conveying feminist messages in a direct but soft way to all.118
Moreover, the state can take soft and direct interventionary
measures when a lack of opportunities or collective action problem
prevents people from forming new preferences.119 The state can thus
assist individuals who are already considering changing their
preferences. For example, by offering subsidies to ultra-orthodox
Jews who are willing to move to a secular neighborhood or to secular
families willing to move to an ultra-orthodox neighborhood, the state
would be encouraging people to consider opportunities that were
previously unavailable to them, thereby creating the potential for
preferences change. While the geographical move in this example
would stem from external financial incentives, the introduction of a
previously unavailable opportunity could have the additional effect
of altering the target group’s internal preferences.
In addition, soft and direct intervention might also be suitable
when people have preferences about preferences.120 In such cases,
people are aware that a first-order preference they hold is
inconsistent with a second-order preference. At times, the state could
Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING AND DESERVING 95,
98 (1970) (punishment is a unique tool used by society to express its disapproval
of a wrongful act); Jean Hampton, The Moral Education Theory of Punishment, 13
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 208, 212 (1984) (arguing that punishment is intended to teach
the wrongdoer that the wrongful act is forbidden because it is morally wrong).
117
Chris Diffee, Going Offshore: Horseplay, Normalization, and Sexual
Harassment, 24 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 302, 368-69 (2013) (referring to the
expressive function of sexual harassment law, which delegitimized behavior
previously considered legitimate by some, and asserting that "[a]ltering the legal
and cultural significance of conduct may in fact prove to be one of the most
effective means of halting the conduct itself").
118
Richard Mullender, Racial Harassment, Sexual Harassment, and the Expressive
Function of Law, 61 MOD. L. REV. 236, 240 (1998) ("The RRA [Race Relations
Act] and the SDA [Sex Discrimination Act] send out messages to the effect that
discrimination on the grounds with which they are respectively concerned is
wrongful."); Danielle Keats Citron, Law's Expressive Value in Combating Cyber
Gender Harassment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 373, 408 (2009) ("When court rulings
declared sexual harassment a manifestation of women's inequality in the
workplace, they changed its social meaning. Courts sent the message that sexual
abuse in the workplace violated women's equality in a manner that would not be
tolerated.").
119
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assist them in resolving this tension by offering them self-binding
mechanisms that would make the satisfaction of their second-order
preferences more feasible. In some circumstances, the state could go
even further, say, by offering to subsidize gastric-banding surgery for
obese people, which would counteract their overeating
preferences.121
D. Soft and Indirect
The Thaler & Sunstein "nudge" idea exemplifies soft and
indirect state intervention. In their book Nudge, they argued that the
state can often change people's behavior not only through coercive
intervention but also by "nudging" them to do what the state wants
them to do, while leaving them with the ultimate choice of whether
or not to do it. Thaler & Sunstein call their theory "LibertarianPaternalism"122—paternalism because the nudge pushes people into
doing what the state considers to be for their good and libertarian
because the choice of what to do remains in the hands of the
individual. Although nudging generally exploits people's cognitive
limitations, this is to a virtuous end according to Thaler & Sunstein.
In some circumstances, however, the nudge in fact neutralizes
people's cognitive limitations that would have otherwise led them in
the wrong direction. An example of such nudging is the default rule
implemented in most countries, under which a certain amount of a
worker's wages is transferred to a pension fund unless she explicitly
opposes this. This rule encourages, rather than obliges, saving for
retirement; anyone can opt out of the default if she so desires.123 Yet
the majority of people submit to the default rule, due to either the
status quo bias124 or the omission bias.125 This context illustrates how
the nudge uses people's cognitive limitations to direct them to what
the state deems to be good for them (since if they were to forego the
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It can be argued, however, that the operation impacts the satisfaction of the
preference as opposed to its very existence.
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Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 4-6 (explaining that libertarian paternalism
is aimed at preserving individual freedom of choice). For criticism of Thaler &
Sunstein’s libertarian-paternalism, see Arad & Rubinstein, supra note 21, at 2-3
(presenting several points of criticism, including lack of transparency of
preferences change policies, difficulties of verifying how different individuals
perceive their own welfare, and the slippery slope concern, which leads to greater
state intervention in individuals' private lives).
123
Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 108-09.
124
See ZAMIR & TEICHMAN, supra note 82, at 674 (discussing the status-quo bias
in the context of judicial decision-making).
125
ZAMIR & TEICHMAN, supra note 82, at 71 (arguing that omission bias is the
tendency to judge harmful acts as worse than no-less-harmful omissions).
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payments to a pension fund, they would save less and consume more,
which is assumed to be contrary to their interests). From a different
perspective, the nudge here can be said to neutralize the common
cognitive limitation of over-optimism, or the optimism bias.126 If
people fail to save money for a rainy day because they are overoptimistic about their future needs, the nudge pushes them into doing
what they would not have done because of their cognitive limitation.
It has also been proposed that nudging be applied to lead people to
act in society's best interests.127 For example, a default rule of
assumed organ donation unless the deceased explicitly indicated
otherwise would result in more organ donations to the benefit of all,
as compared to a default rule that requires explicit consent to being
an organ donor.128
Thaler & Sunstein applied their idea of nudging to changing
people’s behavior. Could this idea be extended to changing
preferences? I believe it could.129 First, the law could nudge people
into behaving in a certain way that would ultimately lead to a change
in their preferences as well.130 The second and more interesting
option would be for the nudge to be used to impact preferences
without directly affecting behaviours.
To see how this second alternative can work, let's return to the
preferences of ultra-orthodox Jews against exposing their children to
secular studies. Assuming these preferences were shaped partially
due to a lack of opportunities to develop other preferences,131 the
state’s mere provision of the missing opportunities would constitute
a nudge towards considering replacing the old preferences with new
ones. Thus, making public colleges and universities more accessible
to ultra-orthodox Jews could, in the long run, bring about a change in
their preferences regarding their children’s education. In Israel, for
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For a discussion of the optimism bias in relation to consumer conduct, see BarGill, supra note 54, at 22-23.
127
See Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 3 (discussing the idea of nudging people in
order to change their behavior in relation to protecting the environment).
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Sunstein, supra note 71, at 42-43 (different default rules regarding organ
donation could increase people's willingness to be donors).
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The nudging idea has been criticized for being manipulative. See, e.g., T. M.
Wilkinson, Nudging and Manipulation, 61 POL. STUD. 341 (2013) (differentiating
between varying forms of nudges and concluding that some forms are prone to
"manipulate and infringe upon the target’s autonomy" and therefore "hard to
justify"); Glaeser, supra note 31, at 155 (describing the government bureaucracy
entailed by soft paternalism as "skilled in manipulating beliefs" and raising
concerns about the abuse of such mechanisms). In contrast, my proposal to apply
nudging to preferences is not manipulative.
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example, universities hesitate over whether to allow gendersegregated classes for ultra-orthodox Jewish students.132 There are
certainly good arguments against doing this, but one advantage,
which should not be easily dismissed, is that it would make higher
education more feasible for the ultra-orthodox community and
provide its members with the opportunities they currently lack when
forming their preferences. Note that in this example, as opposed to
Thaler & Sunstein's nudging context, there is no manipulation
involved: people would be offered previously-unavailable
opportunities that are essential for shaping their preferences.
Another soft and indirect way to change people's preferences is
through a "natural selection," or evolutionary, process. 133 This
approach lies on the borderline between indirectly changing
preferences by directly changing behavior and directly changing
preferences: the law creates the conditions in which it is easier, or
more attractive, for people to develop "desirable" preferences, and
thus, more and more people eventually do develop them. To
illustrate, suppose that the law tends to oblige lawyers to behave
altruistically towards their clients. We can therefore expect that this
will lead to people with an altruistic bent to be more attracted to
becoming lawyers than other people are. Alternatively, suppose that
we want people who care significantly more about their social
contribution than their income to be our judges or doctors. In order to
attract the people with the "right" preferences, then, judges’ and
doctors’ salaries should not be set too high.134
Note that in these examples, the law does not change people's
preferences but instead creates conditions that makes certain
professions more attractive to people with certain preferences. It is
quite possible, however, that the more the state, or the law, makes
certain professional fields appealing to people with certain
preferences, the more people will develop such preferences. This
would occur particularly if the attraction to a given field were to
depend not only on the preference considered most essential to that
132

HCJ 6667/14, Tirosh v. Council for Higher Education (Nevo, March 19, 2015)
(Isr.) (an appeal to the Israel High Court of Justice against government funding of
gender-segregated classes at public universities).
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Cf. Oren Bar-Gill & Chaim Fershtman, Public Policy with Endogenous
Preferences, 7 J. PUB. ECON. THEORY 841 (2005) (explaining how monetary
incentives might induce changes in people's internal preferences); Bar-Gill &
Fershtman, supra note 73 (making a similar argument in a contractual context).
134
See Stephen J. Choi, Mitu G. Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Are Judges Overpaid? A
Skeptical Response to the Judicial Salary Debate, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 47, 56
(2009) (arguing that increased salaries will attract more people to the judiciary but
lower salaries will attract more suitable people, namely, those who wish to serve as
judges unrelated to salary or social status).
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field but on other preferences as well. Thus, if enjoyment of legal
challenges is the appeal for many people to being a judge but the
salary is low, more and more lawyers who are attracted to the
judiciary for this particular reason will develop preferences for
making a social contribution and thereby compensate themselves for
the non-appeal of the low salaries.
CONCLUSION
In Part II, I presented categories of cases in which the usual
objections to state intervention in people's preferences weakens,
while Part III examined four different ways in which the state can
intervene in preferences in such cases. The discussions in the two
parts, when combined, arguably provide an answer to the question of
when it might be desirable for the state to intervene in preferences.
This response accounts for and contends with the general arguments
discussed in Part I against state intervention: personal freedom,
abuse of power, the role of the state, and uncertainty.
The personal freedom argument falters in all categories of cases
discussed in Part II. When preferences create a risk of the imposition
of negative externalities on third parties, the personal freedom
argument is less compelling, since externalities is a common
justification for the law to intervene and curtail risk creators'
freedom. When state intervention is aimed at preventing market
forces from shaping people's preferences, the state is acting to
eliminate effects created by third parties rather than to create new
preferences. Therefore, such intervention can hardly be considered
an infringement on consumers' freedom, for if anything, it enhances
their freedom. When intervention promotes people's second-order
preferences at the expense of discouraging their first-order
preferences, the state is not infringing on people's freedom but rather
assisting them in achieving their goals. In such cases the preferences
change is a Pareto improvement: everyone is made better off and no
one is made worse off. Preferences that were shaped due to a lack of
opportunities or cognitive limitations are not authentic in the deep
sense and were not genuinely created by an autonomous individual.
Thus, state intervention in such instances is aimed at placing the
individual in the position he would have occupied had the missing
opportunities been available to him from the outset and had he been
rational and adequately informed. Finally, when the state intervenes
in preferences in response to a collective action problem, it is in no
way certain that non-intervention would serve individual freedom
better than the intervention does. On the contrary: soft intervention
might enable individuals to shape their preferences more freely than
they would absent the intervention.
The other three arguments against state intervention in
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preferences should be closely examined in each individual case that
raises a need for the state to change people’s preferences. Thus, I will
comment only briefly on each of them. As to the arguments relating
to the abuse of power and the role of the state, the concerns on which
they are anchored do not differ much from similar concerns about
state intervention in people's choices and behavior. The risk of abuse
of power particularly diminishes when the state intervention is soft
and indirect (for example, when the state makes available
opportunities that were unavailable when people formed their
preferences). The uncertainty argument, for its part, is not a valid
concern in the many instances in which it is quite clear what the
change in preferences will bring about (for example, when changing
racist preferences or preferences not to smoke).135
The state intervenes—either through the law or by other
means—to change people’s preferences on a regular basis.
Individuals and, perhaps, also legislators and public officials, are
only rarely aware of the effects of state intervention on preferences.
Since state intervention in preferences is so widespread, it would be
far better that it be done explicitly and transparently. This would
make the intervention open to both public debate and judicial
scrutiny, which would be consistent with liberal democratic
principles.
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